

Why Read Peter Drucker?

by Alan Kantrow

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Summary. Reprint: R0911F Peter Drucker's extensive writings, including more than 30 HBR essays, are landmarks of the managerial profession. They've influenced the practice and teaching of management for decades and no doubt line thousands of bookshelves. But... [more](#)

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Mention the name of Peter Drucker and many an ear in the business forest stands up straight. Over the years little of concern to business has fallen outside the extraordinary range of his interests, and few of those interests have escaped thoughtful, often classic exposition in his six-foot shelf of articles and books.

Such productivity is itself a professional achievement of the first order. Add to it, however, Drucker's countless appearances in executive seminars, lecture halls, conference rooms, and classrooms; his extensive labors as a consultant; and his facility for expressing complex ideas simply and elegantly. No wonder the mention of Peter Drucker commonly guarantees attention. People listen because they respect the authority of experience—distilled, analyzed, articulate—and are eager to profit by it.

There are those, of course, who do not listen so attentively to Drucker. Some, especially within the academy, think him more journalist than scholar and more glib generalizer than journalist. They slight his research as no research at all and his ideas on management as unstructured and (worst sin of all) unsystematic. To their minds Drucker is an armchair philosopher who lacks practical credentials as a *doer*.

At one extreme they believe him neither interested nor competent in the myriad details of day-to-day business operations and therefore question the authority his judgments regularly carry.

At the other extreme Drucker's most attentive followers, like those of many a popular thinker, grant him too much. Out-of-context snippets from his writings or conversations often appear in support of contentions that he himself does not endorse. Similarly, overly ardent disciples reduce the complexity of his thought to a handful of canonical ideas that, in their doctrinaire simplicity, do violence to the original.

In point of fact, Drucker's works lend themselves to these excesses of reaction. By relying in places on such suggestive—but incompletely wrought— notions as the “contribution coefficient,” Drucker offers fertile ground for scholarly naysaying.¹ Conversely, by striving for a pithy, epigrammatical style, he often plays into the hands of those who are too easily satisfied with easy phrases and half-truths. Indeed, it is rhetorically memorable to assert, as Drucker does, that “most sales training is totally unjustified. At best it makes an incompetent salesman out of a moron.” But it also gives heady encouragement to the cavalier dismissal of a perennially knotty problem.

The Purpose of a Company Is to Create a Customer

When I was in college, I saw Peter Drucker's books on my father's bookshelf in his home study— The Effective

...



Sloganeering of either sort, wherever it occurs, is double-edged. Used with care, it allows for a quick, incisive thrust of thought; in the wrong hands, it becomes an effective weapon of simple- or fuzzy-mindedness.

The Influence of Ideas

For the most part, however, Drucker's books command attention neither for their stock of aphorisms nor for their mastery of technical computation. Ears perk up, rather, to catch the wisdom of Drucker's animating ideas. So generally receptive has their audience been and so long-lived their influence that many of his ideas have become part and parcel of today's commonsense understanding of business. As a result, it is not easy—even in retrospect—to achieve critical distance from them.

How remarkably familiar has become his vision of modern industrial society as constituted by large-scale organizations. How obvious it now seems to regard business as the representative institution of that society, and how matter-of-fact an exercise it now is to apply to business the same modes of analysis appropriate to any social or political institution.

Was there a time when people did not regularly ask of individual businesses their source of legitimate authority, their principle of organization, or their pattern of leadership? Was there a time when management felt little need to address employees' concerns for status and function, to fit "knowledge workers" into established structures of decision making and command, or to achieve effective communication in and among managerial levels?

For that matter, did business ever fail to take seriously the recruitment and development of executives, the proper role of boards of directors, or the special needs of companies at different stages of development? Did it fail to pay adequate attention to the internal logic of work itself or to those techniques by which managers can become both more efficient and more effective? Did it ignore such fundamental questions as the nature of the business it was in and of the customers it served?

Today it is hardly front-page news, at least within the business community, when some executive offers a defense of profits as an objective measurement of economic performance or as an essential premium against the risks of the future. Nor is it shocking to hear a call for management to think through long-term strategy as well as to set short-term objectives. A voice recommending that business plan for innovation is no longer a voice crying out in the wilderness.

That none of this seems novel—that it is all quite commonplace—is prime evidence of Drucker's pervasive influence, direct or indirect, on managerial thought. By and large these ideas have long since won acceptance as a kind of professional folk wisdom: They have become home truths.

Drucker's contribution.

To be sure, few of these ideas are original with Drucker. Even fewer have escaped treatment in at least a dozen management texts. Yet there is always a value in reencountering sensible thought sensibly put. But if the substance of his books is neither original nor unique, if what they offer at best is no more or less than the readily paraphrasable content of his thinking, why bother to read them? Why, in short, read Peter Drucker and not a streamlined digest of his major ideas?

The answer is simple: Drucker's real contribution to managerial understanding lies not so much in the cash value of his ideas as in the rigorous activity of mind by which they are formulated. One can learn more—and more deeply—from watching him think than from studying the content of his thought.

Integration of Thought

Most critics assess the substantive contribution of Drucker's works to the discipline of professional management. Yet Drucker's thought is far more valuable for its manner than its matter. First, there is its decidedly integrative quality. To understand essential management tasks, Drucker shows by example that it is necessary to view them in context. One must appreciate the historical universe of traditions and structures out of which they emerged and the cultural universe of norms and values in which they participate. One must know about the many forms capitalism has taken over time and the particular strengths of each form. One must be aware of competing economic ideologies and their underlying premises. In short, one must be able to recognize major shifts in human aspirations as well as the fixed limits of human adaptation .

The Social Sector Redefined

In the summer of 1989, many of us in nonprofit organizations experienced a defining moment: Right around that ...



Then, too, one must be sensitive to the speed, direction, and logic of those technological and demographic changes that will make the future very different from the present. One must, at the same time, carefully ascertain what in the present will last. Not least, one must supplement an understanding of management with insights from other fields of knowledge, regularly comparing it with the summary experience of other large-scale organizations and different cultures.

When brought to bear on even the thorniest of problems, such integrative thinking allows Drucker to identify the key assumptions at issue, to establish their mutual relations, and to evaluate them. Consider, for instance, his lengthy discussion of the curse of bigness in *Concept of the Corporation*.² Here Drucker avoids the needless excesses of those who argue either for or against bigness in business by tracing their operative premise to its root and showing it to be grossly misconceived.

Consciously or not, most opponents of bigness, Drucker finds, are in fact tilting against the windmills of monopoly; its defenders, protecting them. Now, monopoly and bigness are, of course, not the same thing and ought not be confused. But Drucker is able to track the point at issue still further to challenge its historical as well as its logical basis. “This theory of monopoly,” he writes,

“which is still widely accepted as gospel truth, rests on the assumption— correct in the eighteenth century—that supply will always be limited, whereas demand will always be unlimited.”³

This assumption does not always obtain. It may be true of some, but is not necessarily true of all, historical periods. Because Drucker knows the traditional meaning of monopoly and the structural differences between past and present economic conditions, he can refocus an errant discussion.

Other examples suggest themselves. In *The End of Economic Man*, Drucker comprehends the sense behind the seeming irrationality of fascism’s appeal by acknowledging the historical context of its ideas.⁴ According to Drucker, the Great War and the Great Depression destroyed Europe’s already shaken belief in an economic system that was autonomous, governed by rational laws, and productive of both freedom and equality. With the inherited rational world view of classical economics shown to be bankrupt, fascism took powerful hold on the European mind precisely because it was “irrational”—that is, it offered a noneconomic basis for individual status and rank. Drucker reaches the heart of this twentieth-century phenomenon by appreciating the sudden irrelevance of earlier systems of thought.

A similar understanding characterizes his many obiter dicta on Marxism as well as his famous essay on John Maynard Keynes. Drucker writes:

“Keynes’s work was built on the realization that the fundamental assumptions of nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics no longer hold true in an industrial society and a credit economy. But it aimed at the restoration and preservation of the basic beliefs, the basic institutions of nineteenth-century laissez-faire politics; above all, it aimed at the preservation of the autonomy and automatism of the market. The two could no longer be brought

together in a rational system; Keynes's policies are magic spells, formulae, and incantations, to make the admittedly irrational behave rationally." ⁵

Much the same is true of Marx's thought, which treats as a universal given conditions limited to a brief phase of industrial development.

Technological implications.

Drucker's integrative thinking also illuminates the special obligations imposed by technology on modern business enterprise. From his broad familiarity with the history of industrial development, Drucker can argue in *Technology, Management and Society* that there has been a massive "overall change in the nature of technological work during [our] century"—a change in its structure, costs, methods, and conceptual underpinnings. ⁶ He is pointedly aware, for instance, that the professional and institutional qualities of technological work are fundamentally new, as are its geometrically increasing requirements for capital expenditures. He can read the implications of the lengthening transition from research to practical application and can see the need for an essentially new relationship between science and technology. He recognizes as well the dangers of the abrupt telescoping of accustomed product life cycles.

But Drucker's thinking rests on an equally broad familiarity with the history of technology. From what he calls the first technological revolution—the appearance in the ancient world of "irrigation cities" and their attendant civilizations—he abstracts a series of lessons that apply with comparable force to the present. Such a revolution, no matter when it occurs, demands major innovation in social and political institutions. Although the form

of that innovation must follow the new objective reality created by technological change, the values that shape it and the human ends it is to serve still lie within human control .

The Essence of a Company

When I first met Peter Drucker, 15 years ago, he shared with me ideas that have deeply influenced my work ever since. ...



Now more than ever, technology demands of business hardheaded adaptation to objective circumstances and increasingly vigilant commitment to ultimate social purposes. Business must clearly understand and meet both obligations to be successful—even to survive—under these modern conditions. It takes Drucker’s synthesis of technological and industrial history to bring home so balanced a conclusion.

Decision making in Japan.

Perhaps the most striking instance of this integrative thinking is Drucker’s exacting analysis of decision making in Japanese business.⁷ His use of evidence from so alien a culture commands interest not only in itself but also as it throws American practices into sharper relief. In Japan, Drucker finds, the decision-making process is different from its American counterpart in three essential ways: (1) Decisions, as such, tend to be big ones—that is, they have to do with matters of far-reaching importance; (2) in making them, an inordinate amount of time is allowed for the painstaking achievement of consensus among all those concerned; and (3) once made, they rapidly translate into a course of action—one often radically at odds with previous policy.

From his long acquaintance with the Japanese way of doing things, Drucker knows that this otherwise inexplicable sequence of foot-dragging and full speed makes perfect, if unfamiliar, sense. Unlike American managers, whose decisions typically focus on the merits of a single option and whose concerns are more tactical than strategic, the Japanese take great care first to define the precise nature of the issue at hand. Only then do they methodically review every available course of action. Though this process consumes a great deal of time, it ensures that the decision finally reached has been “presold.” With such a consensus established, every concerned manager knows what the decision is, what it means, and what is necessary to make it work.

By contrast, American managers do not as a rule discipline themselves to consider all possible alternatives. More important, they do not regularly force themselves to think through the kind of issue it is that confronts them. As a result their decisions often address symptoms and nearly always have to be “sold” after the fact. Though the compromises made are roughly comparable to those implicit in any Japanese consensus, they are structurally deficient in a way the Japanese ones are not. Coming after the fact, American compromises and the inevitable trade-offs they involve can play havoc with the systematic logic of the original decision; coming before the fact, Japanese compromises are by definition included—and accounted for—within the decision itself.

Context and Logic

The making of decisions in Japan and America, the impact of modern technology, the thought of Keynes and Marx, the appeal of fascism, the curse of bigness—Drucker’s mind plays over each of these topics in much the same way. Ideas for Drucker have both an external historical (or cultural) context and an internal logic of argument. The first gives them their shaping assumptions and conceptual vocabulary; the second, their systematic cogency. The first roots them in time and place; the second makes them more

generally applicable. The first underscores their relativity; the second stresses their universality. Drucker does not deny the tension between context and logic. Rather, by looking closely at both, he is repeatedly able to define the relevant terms of discussion, reduce them to first principles, uncover improper assumptions or inferences, and identify hidden contradictions.

More specifically, he treats wages and wage policy in such a way as to unmask the quite different starting assumptions of employer and employee. He attacks the arbitrariness of the yearly accounting period, pointing up the great distance between an abstract convention and the reality it is to represent. He shows the typical criteria for promotion within management to be structurally contradictory—that is, in conflict with binding economic objectives. In each instance, Drucker’s obstinate refusal to accept conventions at face value allows him to see through them to their formative premises.

Drucker’s holism.

This breadth of critical vision is, in turn, an apt expression of an instinctively holistic process of thought. As a number of Drucker-watchers have argued, his mind gravitates neither to the isolated fact nor to the mechanically causal explanation. Instead, Drucker responds most richly to the kaleidoscopic patterns and configurations among facts and to the process-based explanation of their significance. Separate, random data become facts, and isolated facts take on importance only by virtue of their participation in—and relation to—wholes larger than themselves.

Drucker’s holism is most readily apparent in *The Age of Discontinuity*, where he discusses the nonevolutionary “discontinuities” in the modern social universe.⁸ The explosion of new technologies, the emergence of a truly integrated global economy, the central role of knowledge as an economic resource, and the appearance of countless nongovernmental institutions—

all these suggest a radical change in the world as we now know it. They are, in his judgment, like the “drifts that form new continents.” They represent massive, but largely hidden, alterations in the very foundations of our lives. The evidence for them lies on all sides, but it takes Drucker’s holistic cast of mind to piece them together, to recognize their form, and to assess their import.

The same is true of Drucker’s analyses of management proper. For example, his insistence on marketing as *the* essential, ubiquitous task of management attests to a view of business as a process necessarily oriented toward the creation and satisfaction of customers. Similarly, he extrapolates a few ideal patterns from the mass of individual variations of production and organization principles. In fact, when Drucker writes of the profession of management, he invariably conceives of it as a discipline that teaches its practitioners to identify the constellations of significance in the otherwise chaotic flow of information and circumstance.

Broadly contextual, logical, holistic, Drucker’s play of thought—his real contribution to the discipline of management—enacts a kind of ongoing drama of perspective. It does far more than simply impart useful information. It provides a case study in how to think.

Drucker’s fair-mindedness.

Drucker’s writing is instructive in yet another way. Though often pointed and prescriptive, it rarely loses its tone of calm rationality or strays from its primary commitment to objective analysis. Quite the opposite: It is remorselessly fair-minded. There are, of course, sins in the world—political, social, managerial—that earn Drucker’s scorn and contempt, but he gives them all an impartial hearing before pronouncing sentence.

The Responsibility of Management Consultants

I knew Peter Drucker for 30 years. Aside from the personal career advice he gave me, his view of the responsibility of ...



To some, this unflappable deliberateness proves maddening beyond words. “Yes, yes, get on with it,” they murmur impatiently. Yet *not* “getting on with it,” at least in the sense intended, is one of Drucker’s most valuable accomplishments. Impatience of mind turns over the authority in argument to the itch of irritation and removes it from the sway of reason. Knowledgeable observers have attributed much of former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau’s long-lived success to his indefatigable derriere, which allowed him in many a meeting to outsit—and therefore out-argue—his less-patient opponents. Not quite so graphically, but every bit as effectively, Drucker’s hardened allegiance to the measured pace of reason gives his conclusions an insistent persuasiveness.

When reading Drucker, one responds not only to the fair-mindedness but also to the obvious grace and cultivation of language. His prose is refreshingly literate; his scope of reference, enormous; his offhanded manner of phrasing significant observations, disarmingly and deceptively simple. One is inclined to believe what Drucker says because one trusts the voice doing the saying: It neither threatens nor perplexes but holds out the promise that even the most complicated topics are malleable to experience, orderly thought, and plain good sense.

Consider, for a moment, the following excerpt from *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices*. The immediate context is a discussion, perhaps a bit dated, of those situations in which “knowledge professionals” may legitimately receive more in salary than the managers over them:

“There is even an instructive business precedent for this. When Pierre S. du Pont and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. first attempted, in 1920, to bring order into the chaos of the General Motors Company, they set the same salary for the heads of the operating divisions as for the president, Pierre du Pont. But, at his own request, Sloan received substantially less as the operating vice-president to whom the division heads reported. The manager of a unit composed of career professionals or specialists will, of course, receive more money than most of the men in the unit, but it should not be considered unusual, let alone undesirable, for one or two ‘stars’ of the group to receive more money than the manager. This can apply as well to salesmen; a star salesman should be expected to make more money than the regional sales manager. It should apply in the research laboratory, and in all other areas where performance depends on individual skill, effort, and knowledge.”⁹

Even when this represented a controversial topic and an even more controversial point of view, Drucker so presented it as to make it appear reasonable and cogent. How does he accomplish this? First, he makes alien ground familiar by citing appropriate precedent from the history of General Motors. Second, he reports the central action (what Sloan did) in such a way (“at his own request”) that he transforms an abstract issue of structure into a more tangible one of managerial judgment. Third, he generalizes the assumptions on which Sloan’s judgment was founded, translating them back into structural terms. Fourth, he suggests their potential range of application. Finally, he distills from them their essential, defining principle.

Distance Has Been Eliminated

When we founded Haier, in the 1980s, virtually all products were in short supply in China, and the key to reaping huge ...



Drucker's process of discussion, then, is to establish relevant precedent, make it comprehensible in human terms, articulate its organizational implications, define its limits, and make clear what it is really about. His mind plays over the issue at hand, looking at it from various perspectives, indicating now this, now that aspect of importance. Drucker engages the reader by a tour de force of reflection but convinces him, if at all, by a tone of responsible authority and a commonsense flow of reasoning.

Rhetorical firepower.

Such are the mechanics of a typical piece of Drucker's prose. He does not drag the reader kicking and screaming toward some undesired conclusion. To the contrary, he gently takes him by the arm and walks about with him until his conclusion appears a most reasonable place to go. His step along the way is usually calm, measured, deliberate. But not always. Every now and then he breaks into a flag-waving charge up some rhetorical San Juan Hill. Here, for instance, is Drucker in full stride on the issue of profits:

"In fact, the concept [the all-too-familiar equation of profits with the profit motive] is worse than irrelevant: it does harm. It is a major cause for the misunderstanding of the nature of profit in our society and for the deep-seated hostility to profit which are among the most dangerous diseases of an industrial society. It is

largely responsible for the worst mistakes of public policy—in this country as well as in Western Europe—which are squarely based on the failure to understand the nature, function, and purpose of business enterprise. And it is in large part responsible for the prevailing belief that there is an inherent contradiction between profit and a company’s ability to make a social contribution. Actually, a company can make a social contribution only if it is highly profitable. To put it crudely, a bankrupt company is not likely to be a good company to work for, or likely to be a good neighbor and a desirable member of the community—no matter what some sociologists of today seem to believe to the contrary.”

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There are no two ways about it: This is angry, immoderate prose. True, its immediate context is a reasoned discussion of the logical difference between terms like the “profit motive,” which refer to psychological realities, and terms like “profitability,” which refer to abstract standards of entrepreneurial measurement. And true, its more general context is the group of passages scattered throughout Drucker’s works that argue a strong case for profits as an essential premium against the risks of the future.

Nevertheless, this is angry prose. Its incremental rhythms are those of the pulpit; its logic collapses long sequences of cause and effect into simple trigger mechanisms; its dismissive tone gives no quarter to doubters. It may be a significant departure from Drucker’s rhetorical norm, but it is neither accidental nor ineffective. It is flag-waving with a purpose.

As Drucker well knows, language instructs and animates not only by convincing the reason but also by breaking down or through a recalcitrant will. When the stakes are high enough and the intellectual stubbornness of some in his audience great enough, Drucker will take the reader by force, breaching accustomed

defenses with sheer rhetorical firepower. He does not often make such an attempt, but he is a good enough verbal tactician to carry it off when he does.

Moral Concerns

Even with passages like this in front of them, a number of Drucker's critics have taken him to task for what they see as a conspicuous lack of passion in his thought, a certain detachment from his material. They are quite wrong. There is an immense difference between a dispassionate and a nonpassionate intelligence. Drucker's studied objectivity reflects a genuine commitment to dispassionate, though hardly nonpassionate, reason. Indeed, much of his thought reflects a terrible urgency of moral purpose. Drucker is so deeply concerned about the profession of management because he is profoundly afraid of what might happen if the major institutions of Western society fail in their essential responsibilities.

As any halfway attentive reader of Drucker's earlier books or his recent autobiography cannot help but notice, the lessons of fascism in Italy and national socialism in Germany have not been lost on him. That traumatic passage of history is continually present to his mind in a way simply not possible for other writers on management who are both younger in years and American by birth. (Drucker was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1909.) They can never share the shattering immediacy of his sense of the price paid by twentieth-century society for institutional failure.

In today's world, Drucker believes, the human freedoms most genuinely cherished depend to a great extent for their protection on large-scale organizations. When successful, those organizations allow for a large measure of the human fulfillment now available to Western man. They provide the main stage for achievement of personal freedom and for assumption of responsibility through self-control. If the institutions of business

cannot meet the cumulative needs of economic performance, society, and the individual, nothing stands between any of us and the forces of chaos and terror. No wonder, then, that Drucker puts such great emphasis on the character of managers and on the immense responsibilities they bear.

What to Read

Given the disposition to read Drucker, but with limited time, to which of his books should you turn? The choice is unusually difficult because Drucker has not only written many, but many different kinds of books. They do, however, fall roughly into four separate groupings: social and political thought, analyses of the profession of management and of the institutions of business, informed speculations on those contours of the future already visible in the present, and how-to primers for certain business-related tasks. Some titles, of course, fit into more than a single grouping; a few do not fit neatly into any of them.

First among the books of social and political thought is *The End of Economic Man*, Drucker's remarkably evenhanded treatment of twentieth-century European fascism. Two further publications complete the cycle of thought there begun: *The Future of Industrial Man*,¹¹ which addresses the central problem of legitimate authority in modern institutions, and *The New Society*,¹² which sketches an idealized vision of industrial citizenship. *Men, Ideas and Politics*, one of Drucker's several collections of essays, offers a certain number of grace notes, including novel reflections on Søren Kierkegaard, John C. Calhoun, and Henry Ford.

The books on management proper also form a cycle of thought. *Concept of the Corporation* is Drucker's pathbreaking study of General Motors. *The Practice of Management*¹³ and *Management:*

Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices are perhaps his two most famous contributions to the study of management as a professional discipline.

In the third group fall two collections of essays, *America's Next Twenty Years*¹⁴ and *Technology, Management and Society*, as well as *Landmarks of Tomorrow*,¹⁵ all of which pretty much deliver what their titles suggest. *The Age of Discontinuity* identifies and assesses radical changes in the foundations of the modern world. By contrast, *The Unseen Revolution*—much faulted as it has been for confusing ownership with control—considers a different, though no less radical, sort of change: the development of what Drucker calls “pension fund socialism” in America.¹⁶

Finally, there are the how-to books: *Managing for Results*, with its emphasis on tactics for improving economic performance, and *The Effective Executive*,¹⁷ with its suggestions for making executives more effective managers of both themselves and others.

Drucker's most recent book, his autobiographical *Adventures of a Bystander*, belongs to none of these categories.¹⁸ No matter. The cast of characters among whom Drucker moves, especially in the European chapters, is superbly rich, and the informed glimpse he provides of a vanished social and political universe is an education in itself. *Adventures* is often better than a novel, more lively than an essay, and as thoughtful as both at their best. *The Age of Discontinuity* is in the same class. This, too, offers pleasure reading, albeit of a different sort. It is becoming ever more important for top managers to think productively about the significant shape of the future, and *Discontinuity* provides an endlessly provocative model for doing so.

If ever there is time enough and the mood of reflection is with you, work your way slowly through *The Future of Industrial Man* . This is Drucker's vision of the central problems facing industrial society—those of freedom and legitimacy—which do not appear nightly on the television news.

Most important of all is *The Practice of Management* , Drucker's best book on the managerial profession. Far more crisp than the larger compendium on *Management* , nicely balanced between precept and example, this book is eminently practical yet of genuine intellectual breadth. If Drucker's work holds anything of immediate value for you, you will most likely find it here. . . .

Remember, however, that the greatest value of reading Drucker consists in a sustained exposure to the disciplined activity of his mind—and not merely to the paraphrasable substance of his ideas. The ideas, of course, are there in abundance and are certainly worth close attention. But as Dr. Johnson (that great eighteenth-century humanist) well understood, the truly important thing with books is not to pluck their individual blossoms but to “grasp the Trunk hard only, and you will shake all the branches.” In the work of Peter Drucker, grasp hard the discipline of mind.

To read more on Peter Drucker's legacy, please visit:
<http://hbdm.harvardbusiness.org/hbr/drucker/index.html>

1. *Managing for Results* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 31–32.
2. *Concept of the Corporation* (New York: John Day, 1946), pp. 209–229.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
4. *The End of Economic Man* (New York: John Day, 1939).

5. "Keynes: Economics as a Magical System," in *Men, Ideas and Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 235.
6. "Technological Trends in the Twentieth Century," in *Technology, Management and Society* (New York, Harper & Row, 1970), p. 55.
7. For Drucker's analysis of Japanese management, see, "Japan Tries for a Second Miracle," and "What We Can Learn from Japanese Management," in *Men, Ideas and Politics* , and *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), Chapter 20.
8. *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). See also the preface to the paperback edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
9. *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* , p. 397.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
11. *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York: John Day, 1942).
12. *The New Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).
13. *The Practice of Management* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).
14. *America's Next Twenty Years* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
15. *Landmarks of Tomorrow* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).
16. *The Unseen Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
17. *The Effective Executive* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

18. *Adventures of a Bystander* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

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Alan Kantrow is an advisor to tertiary educational institutions around the world.

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